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eral Procedure
Uniformity is a recurring
theme of procedural reform.
So deeply is the idea of
uniformity embedded in
American legal thought
that many find it difficult
or unnecessary to explain
why uniformity is thought to
be good. Indeed, reformers
are inclined to speak of
uniformity as if it were some
excellence in itself - like
health, happiness or virtue.
Whether because of the lure
of simplicity, the appearance of
neutrality, the likeness to science, the
feel of efficiency, the imprimatur of
professionalism, the suggestion of
fairness or some combination of these,
the norm of procedural uniformity enjoys
widespread appeal. To be sure, there are
critics of uniformity-inspired rules and
reforms, but even these critics seldom
take issue with the normative value of
procedural uniformity. Rather, they
dispute the notion that a proposed reform
is necessarily just, wise, fair or efficient
simply because it promotes uniformity.
One dimension of procedural
uniformity is the quest for identical rules
for federal and state courts. Intra-state
uniformity was one of the advertised
features of those who argued for and
drafted the original Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (FRCP). For example, Senator
Thomas Wall Shelton argued, "[G]ive the
states an opportunity to follow the Federal
government. That state which tries to live
unto itself will suffer, if it does not perish.
In spite of ourselves, we are all for one
and one for all.... [A] simple, scientific,
correlated system of rules, such as would
be prepared and promulgated by the
Supreme Court of the United States, would
prove a model that would, for reasons of
convenience as well as of principle, be
adopted by the states."' What Shelton's
argument lacked in modesty and nuance, it
supplied in confidence and passion.
Nationwide, state adoption of the
FRCP has occurred to some extent.
A flurry of state reforms followed the
promulgation of the original FRCP. Three
of our southwestern sister states - Arizona,
Colorado and New Mexico - were the first
to replicate the FRCP - in 1940, 1941 and
1942, respectively. Throughout the next
decade, Utah and handful of other states
joined the list. And in 1953, the Nevada
Rules of Civil Procedure (NRCP) took
effect; the NRCP conformed to the federal
model, with few exceptions. By 1960, state
procedural systems were approximately
evenly divided among procedural systems
modeled on the federal rules, the common
law and the Field Code. By 1980, more
than half of the states had procedural
systems that substantially conformed to the
federal model. Naturally, the rhetoric of
uniformity played a substantial role in the
debate about these state reforms.
But state adoption of the FRCP
then ground to a halt. Many states, like
California, New York and most other
highly populated states, have never
adopted the FRCP. Importantly, however,
even in states that never modeled their
procedural systems on the FRCP, there
are procedures that reflect the influence
of the FRCP. For example, all states have
adopted the summary judgment device,
which is an innovation of the FRCP.
Moreover, there can be uniformity in
practice with respect to state and federal
procedural systems even when the rules
differ in fact. The first law review article
that I ever wrote demonstrated how state
courts that had not adopted the FRCP often
applied their textually dissimilar rules
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in a manner that nevertheless tracked
outcomes prescribed by the corresponding
federal court's interpretations of the
FRCP. Thus any practical assessment of
uniformity requires more nuance than a
comparison of texts.
Uniformity is a complicated picture
even in states that once adopted the
FRCP. States that conformed to the
federal model were in lockstep only as
of the date of replication; indeed, this is
static, not dynamic conformity. The FRCP
have been amended 39 times since 1938,
including in each of 20 of the past 25
years. States like Nevada that adopted the
original FRCP have not kept pace with the
extraordinary
number of
amendments
to the FRCP.
Indeed, state
adoption vel
non of the
many FRCP
amendments is
a hodge-podge.
Notably,
intra-state
uniformity's
loss is this
procedural historian's gain. A tour of
various states' procedures is like walking
through a time machine that transports
one to an earlier era of federal procedure.
If one were to travel through New
Mexico, Colorado and Utah state courts,
for example, one could sample practice
under the text of three different versions of
Federal Rule 11, namely circa pre-1983,
circa 1983-1993 and circa post-1993.
Yet all three of these states are generally
thought to be among the category of
states that follow the federal model. One
respected scholar observed in 2003 that
the FRCP were "less influential in state
courts today than at anytime [sic] in the
past quarter-century" and that they "have
lost credibility as avatars of procedural
reform."' Put another way, the virus
that has caused a feverish number of
amendments at the federal level was not
contagious.
Yet the lure of uniformity
understandably persists. For practitioners
or litigants who appear in Nevada
federal and state courts, for example,
eliminating superficial differences and
traps for the unwary can be useful. And
conforming state procedure to a corpus
of rules that has multi-volume treatises
and voluminous case law interpreting
it is also of some benefit. Further still,
the extended, cumbrous and transparent
rulemaking process at the federal level
presumably means that those rules are
thoroughly vetted and, ideally, represent
a fair balance of competing interests.
Accordingly, the committee that the
Nevada Supreme Court named to review
and, if appropriate, to revise the Nevada
Rules of Civil Procedure recognized the
virtue of intra-state uniformity.
To be sure, many of the recent
amendments to the NRCP aligned our
state procedure with the FRCP. When
a scholar next measures federal and
state procedural
conformity, Nevada
will appear near
the top of that list.
Yet I can verify that
the committee took
pains to keep the
norm of uniformity
in perspective. As
I reflect on my
experience on the
committee, I recall
five reasons the
committee rejected
various aspects of the modern FRCP, and
instead retained Nevada practice.
The number, the substantive mix and
the stakes of federal and state caseloads
are significantly different. Some practices
and procedures that may be salutary
for managing federal cases would be
counterproductive in our state court.
State courts do not have the
judicial resources that federal procedure
presupposes. The dispersed and distinctive
practices in the various parts of our state
pose technical and budgetary challenges that
the federal court system does not confront.
Many litigants do not have the
resources that federal procedure
presupposes. The rulemaking committee
endeavored to simplify state practice and
procedure, not make it more expensive or
complicated to navigate.
Some of Nevada's substantive
laws were enacted or have evolved with
the expectation of a certain procedural
foundation. Averse to revising
substantive law (even if indirectly), the
rulemaking committee did not disturb
such procedural foundations.
In certain areas of practice and
procedure, Nevada's approach was (and
remains) normatively better than the
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FRCP. In this sense, our state procedure is
a laboratory for experimentation where our
unique approach has not only the obvious
internal return, but also some external benefit
as an example that other states or the federal
courts could someday follow.
Procedural rulemaking is an important
domain. Although procedure may have the
veneer of an ancillary and perfunctory set
of rules of etiquette designed to ensure the
application of the more important rules of
substantive law, in fact procedure is power.
And the exercise of any power can be used for
good or ill. This rule committee discharged
its duties with a solemn appreciation of its
responsibilities, and its work product reflects
the compromise of competing interests and
the calibration of myriad objectives, including
intra-state uniformity. NL
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